{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-91085","assignerOrgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"apache","dateReserved":"2026-09-14T17:55:38.562Z","datePublished":"2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","shortName":"apache","dateUpdated":"2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z"},"title":"Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"description":"CWE-862","lang":"en","cweId":"CWE-862","type":"CWE"}]}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"affected":[{"vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"Apache Karaf","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"0","lessThan":"4.4.12","versionType":"semver"}],"defaultStatus":"unaffected"}],"descriptions":[{"value":"Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install  fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.","lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"type":"text/html","base64":false,"value":"Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.

The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.

config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.

Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.

By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

Mitigation

Add install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.
"}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt","tags":["vendor-advisory"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"Textual description of severity","content":{"text":"moderate"}},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","value":"Rin Ray ","type":"reporter"}],"x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 1.0.3"}},"adp":[{"title":"CVE Program Container","references":[{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","shortName":"CVE","dateUpdated":"2026-09-29T09:15:47.789Z"}},{"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"scope":"UNCHANGED","version":"3.1","baseScore":6.3,"attackVector":"NETWORK","baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L","integrityImpact":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","attackComplexity":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","confidentialityImpact":"LOW"}},{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-10-01T14:17:41.304608Z","id":"CVE-2026-91085","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z"}}]}}