{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-80674","assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"Linux","dateReserved":"2026-08-26T14:34:25.782Z","datePublished":"2026-08-28T06:49:13.549Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-29T06:22:01.603Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux","dateUpdated":"2026-08-29T06:22:01.603Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator\n\nA base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()\nonly on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*\nattribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation\nat all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --\nntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and\nntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads\nattr_list_entry fixed-header fields\n(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with\nbounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident\nattribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive\nout-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.\n\nload_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),\nale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an\n\"al < al_start + size\" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the\nfixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.\n\nFactor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),\nwhich requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct\nattr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,\nthat ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the\nname, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.\nntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries\ntile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()\n(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the\nresident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped\nvalidation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other\ntwo attribute-list walks."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:N - NTFS registers ntfs_export_ops; remote nfsd/ksmbd VFS lookups on an exported crafted NTFS volume reach ntfs_iget→ntfs_read_locked_inode and subsequent ntfs_external_attr_find/ntfs_attrlist_need walks without local syscall access.\nAC:L - Attacker fully controls on-disk resident $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry headers (length, name_offset, mft_reference) in a crafted image; triggering the slab OOB read is deterministic once the inode is accessed with no races.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires only read access to mounted NTFS content (e.g., NFS/SMB client on an exported share) or supplying removable media the host later mounts; the attribute-list walk paths need no init-namespace root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN.\nUI:N - Once a crafted NTFS volume is mounted and exported (or loop-mounted in a user namespace), normal remote lookups/opens or attribute operations reach the unvalidated resident attribute-list parsing without further victim interaction.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and potential kernel crash remain within the mounting host kernel security authority; this is standard filesystem metadata parsing, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox scope change.\nC:H - ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents(), and ntfs_attrlist_need() read attr_list_entry fixed-header fields (lowest_vcn, mft_reference, name) past the kmalloc attr_list buffer end, disclosing adjacent slab heap memory.\nI:H - Attacker-controlled attribute-list lengths and offsets drive kernel parsing of forged metadata and adjacent slab contents; per kernel CNA guidance this memory-corruption class can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel modification or control-flow hijack beyond the immediate read.\nA:H - Out-of-bounds reads from the attribute-list buffer can fault on invalid adjacent memory or otherwise oops/panic the kernel during inode attribute walks on lookup, extent attach, or attribute-list maintenance paths."}]}],"affected":[{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["fs/ntfs/attrib.c","fs/ntfs/attrib.h","fs/ntfs/inode.c"],"versions":[{"version":"1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669","lessThan":"55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669","lessThan":"7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8","status":"affected","versionType":"git"}]},{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["fs/ntfs/attrib.c","fs/ntfs/attrib.h","fs/ntfs/inode.c"],"versions":[{"version":"7.1","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","lessThan":"7.1","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.1.5","lessThanOrEqual":"7.1.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.2","lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"7.1","versionEndExcluding":"7.1.5"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"7.1","versionEndExcluding":"7.2"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8"}],"title":"ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}}}