{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-77316","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-08-20T19:24:11.617Z","datePublished":"2026-11-19T21:46:58.995Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-19T21:46:58.995Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding (validate_url_ssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning)","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-918","lang":"en","description":"CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":7.1,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g"},{"name":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/bf748df864d348004cf45d830bc59f62c5c4a58a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/bf748df864d348004cf45d830bc59f62c5c4a58a"},{"name":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.8","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.8"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"flytohub","product":"flyto-core","versions":[{"version":"< 2.26.8","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-11-19T21:46:58.995Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, validate_url_ssrf() in src/core/utils.py validates one DNS answer and then returns the hostname, while guarded_aiohttp_request(), enforce_outbound_url(), and validate_url_with_env_config() allow the outbound connection to perform an independent second lookup. A caller with control of the hostname's DNS can make validation see a public address and make the connection see an internal address, bypassing the guard across its outbound consumers and exposing readable internal or metadata-service responses. The attack requires low or zero DNS TTL behavior and a successful timing-dependent answer change; static multiple-address answers are checked and do not provide the same bypass. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}}}}