{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-67543","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-07-29T18:47:17.074Z","datePublished":"2026-11-11T21:39:53.192Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-11T21:39:53.192Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-94","lang":"en","description":"CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-269","lang":"en","description":"CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73"},{"name":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5"},{"name":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7"},{"name":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"heymrun","product":"heym","versions":[{"version":"< 0.0.70","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-11-11T21:39:53.192Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}}}}