{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-59979","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-07-07T19:41:00.004Z","datePublished":"2026-10-28T15:36:57.833Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-28T15:36:57.833Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"YosemiteCrew: Missing organization authorization on service and PMS library/template routes","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-639","lang":"en","description":"CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-862","lang":"en","description":"CWE-862: Missing Authorization","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.3,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/YosemiteCrew/Yosemite-Crew/security/advisories/GHSA-256m-gg99-4274","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/YosemiteCrew/Yosemite-Crew/security/advisories/GHSA-256m-gg99-4274"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"YosemiteCrew","product":"Yosemite-Crew","versions":[{"version":"<= bc1a1824b1a7eba2bc61176cdb61d9a2a11bce57","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-10-28T15:36:57.833Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"YosemiteCrew provides organization-based service and task management. In the source-reported affected main and dev snapshots, YosemiteCrew's service and PMS task-library/template routes omit organization and permission checks. `authorizeCognito` in `apps/backend/src/middlewares/auth.ts` sets the authenticated user's ID but does not provide the `withOrgPermissions()` and `requirePermission(...)` checks used by protected siblings. In `apps/backend/src/routers/service.router.ts`, `PATCH /fhir/v1/service/:id` and `DELETE /fhir/v1/service/:id` are authentication-only, while `GET /fhir/v1/service/:id` has no authentication middleware. The trace through `apps/backend/src/controllers/web/service.controller.ts` to `apps/backend/src/services/service.service.ts` passes a global record ID into `ServiceModel.findById(oid)` without an `organisationId` filter. In `apps/backend/src/routers/task.router.ts`, `PUT /v1/task/pms/library/:libraryId`, `POST /v1/task/pms/templates`, `PATCH /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` and `DELETE /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` likewise lack organization/role enforcement. Any registered platform user, including a patient/companion-app account, can modify or delete another organization's service catalogue and PMS task-library/template data, affecting bookings and billing; service records can additionally be read without authentication. An earlier security change protected create routes but left these sibling operations exposed. A fixed release cannot be established from the available evidence."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-256m-gg99-4274","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}}}}