{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-55441","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-06-16T21:59:57.017Z","datePublished":"2026-06-26T16:48:23.194Z","dateUpdated":"2026-06-26T18:41:26.486Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"mise: Arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-78","lang":"en","description":"CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-94","lang":"en","description":"CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-732","lang":"en","description":"CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.6,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"REQUIRED","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"jdx","product":"mise","versions":[{"version":"< 2026.6.4","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-06-26T16:48:23.194Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-06-26T18:14:26.577413Z","id":"CVE-2026-55441","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-06-26T18:41:26.486Z"}}]}}