{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-53942","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-06-11T15:46:12.318Z","datePublished":"2026-10-23T14:25:00.085Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T14:57:32.991Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"Conda Organization Infrastructure: Pwn Request in update workflow allows PR-controlled template rendering with SYNC_TOKEN","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-94","lang":"en","description":"CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"LOW","baseScore":9.9,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/security/advisories/GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/security/advisories/GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh"},{"name":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/commit/9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/commit/9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"conda","product":"infrastructure","versions":[{"version":"< 9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T14:25:00.085Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-10-23T14:54:29.744728Z","id":"CVE-2026-53942","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T14:57:32.991Z"}}]}}