{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-48076","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-05-20T18:25:25.708Z","datePublished":"2026-08-06T20:43:59.953Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-07T14:34:21.718Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"OpenReception's bootstrap booking flow allows unauthenticated booking on isPublic=false channels","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-863","lang":"en","description":"CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"LOW","baseScore":6.5,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software","versions":[{"version":"<= 1.0.1","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-08-06T20:43:59.953Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. The new-client booking flow in versions 1.0.1 and prior consists of three calls: `bootstrap-challenge` (returns a 16-bit PoW challenge with `difficulty=4` leading hex zeroes), `bootstrap-verify` (validates the PoW and issues a Bearer booking access token), and `create-new-client` (consumes the token and creates the tunnel and first appointment). The token correctly binds to `tenantId`, `tunnelId`, `clientPublicKey`, and `emailHash`, but never to `channelId`. The `bootstrap-challenge` request schema does not even accept a `channelId`, and the issued token's payload contains no channel information. Independently, the service function `createNewClientWithAppointment` checks only `channel.archived = false`. The `channel.isPublic` check that protects `addAppointmentToTunnel` is missing in the new-client path. The combination means: an attacker completes the bootstrap flow normally (16-bit PoW, completes in well under one second on commodity hardware, no rate limiting beyond the throttle store), receives a valid booking access token, and then submits the `create-new-client` payload with `channelId` pointing to a private (`isPublic = false`) channel. The booking lands as `CONFIRMED` if the target channel has `requiresConfirmation = false` (the default), otherwise as `NEW`. The patient-facing UI does not list private channels in its picker (`/api/public/channels` correctly filters `isPublic = true`), so the channel ID must be obtained out of band. The companion finding V-10 (schedule endpoint discloses private channels) provides exactly that: a single unauthenticated GET reveals every private channel ID for any tenant. V-10 plus V-11 together make private channels fully reachable to anonymous attackers. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-08-07T14:34:15.376977Z","id":"CVE-2026-48076","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-08-07T14:34:21.718Z"}}]}}