{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-48074","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-05-20T18:25:25.708Z","datePublished":"2026-08-06T20:27:21.240Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-07T17:02:59.982Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-863","lang":"en","description":"CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":2.7,"baseSeverity":"LOW","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"HIGH","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-6f8g-wfxp-mqxw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-6f8g-wfxp-mqxw"},{"name":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5e77fd1df4262d09bfa6b59acfec4f66408de570","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5e77fd1df4262d09bfa6b59acfec4f66408de570"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software","versions":[{"version":"< 1.0.6","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-08-06T20:27:21.240Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-6f8g-wfxp-mqxw","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-6f8g-wfxp-mqxw","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-08-07T17:01:50.443635Z","id":"CVE-2026-48074","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-08-07T17:02:59.982Z"}}]}}