{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-42810","assignerOrgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"apache","dateReserved":"2026-04-30T14:22:36.663Z","datePublished":"2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z","dateUpdated":"2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Apache Polaris","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","versions":[{"lessThan":"1.4.1","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<span style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\">Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n<br><br>\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n<br><br>\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n<br>\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n<br>\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n<br>- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n<br>- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n<br><br>\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n<br><br>\n<span style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\">A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`).</span> In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n<br><br>\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.</span><br>"}],"value":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure."}],"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"text":"important"},"type":"Textual description of severity"}},{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":9.4,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","privilegesRequired":"LOW","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","subIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]},{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":9.9,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-116","description":"CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-20","description":"CWE-20 Improper Input Validation","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","shortName":"apache","dateUpdated":"2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9"}],"source":{"discovery":"INTERNAL"},"title":"Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names","x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 0.2.0"}},"adp":[{"title":"CVE Program Container","references":[{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11"}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","shortName":"CVE","dateUpdated":"2026-05-04T17:37:04.202Z"}},{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-05-04T18:32:53.859435Z","id":"CVE-2026-42810","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z"}}]}}