{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-41583","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-04-21T14:15:21.959Z","datePublished":"2026-05-08T14:55:50.120Z","dateUpdated":"2026-05-08T19:42:57.297Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-573","lang":"en","description":"CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","subAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":9.3,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","version":"4.0"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"ZcashFoundation","product":"zebra","versions":[{"version":"zebrad < 4.3.1","status":"affected"},{"version":"zebra-script < 5.0.2","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-05-08T14:55:50.120Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the \"canonical\" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-05-08T19:42:41.730920Z","id":"CVE-2026-41583","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-05-08T19:42:57.297Z"}}]}}