{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-133853","assignerOrgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"CIRCL","dateReserved":"2026-11-20T14:44:25.304Z","datePublished":"2026-11-20T14:44:31.341Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-20T16:33:24.293Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"modules":["app/chatbot/chatbot_core.py"],"product":"flowintel","programFiles":["app/chatbot/chatbot_core.py"],"repo":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel","vendor":"flowintel","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.1.0","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"David Cruciani"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"FlowIntel's chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user's authenticated identity could be applied to another user's tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request.\n\nPreconditions:\n- An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface.\n- Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user's credentials were written to the process environment.\n\nImpact:\n- A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases).\n- A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential.\n- The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface.\n\nAffected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-126","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-126 Session Hijacking"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":6,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","privilegesRequired":"LOW","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]},{"format":"SSVC","other":{"content":{"options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"Supplier","timestamp":"2026-11-20T14:41:59Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"SSVC"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-290","description":"CWE-290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-200","description":"CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","shortName":"CIRCL","dateUpdated":"2026-11-20T14:44:31.341Z"},"references":[{"name":"Security patch","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user's identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure."}],"title":"FlowIntel Chatbot Shared MCP Session Allows Cross-User API Identity Confusion","x_gcve":[{"extensions":{"bcp-05-x-01":{"ai_annotations":[{"ai_level":"generated","description":"Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.","gna_source":1,"models":[{"gna_source":1,"identifier":"qwen3.8:27b","name":"qwen3.8:27b","source":"ollama"}],"review_status":"full","scope":"record","tags":["ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated","ai-computer-assisted:classification"]}]},"bcp-05-x-02":{"x_patch2vuln":{"assumptions":["AC:H is assumed because reliable exploitation requires concurrent requests from two different authenticated users or a specific timing window around the shared session restart; a single sequential request may not trigger the identity confusion.","PR:L assumes any authenticated user with chatbot access can trigger the issue; the patch does not evidence a higher privilege requirement.","VC:H assumes the data accessed (private cases, investigations) constitutes high confidentiality impact; the patch tests reference 'PRIVATE ADMIN INVESTIGATION' as the sensitive resource.","CAPEC-126 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping but does not precisely describe a server-side shared-credential race; no CAPEC specifically covers multi-tenant credential isolation failures in a shared in-process session.","The affected version range is taken from the explicit analyst context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.","No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata."],"capecRationale":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-126","rationale":"The closest available CAPEC. The shared MCP session acted as a single long-lived session whose credentials could be 'hijacked' by a concurrent request from a different user, causing the wrong identity to be used. No CAPEC specifically covers 'shared per-tenant credential state in a multi-user service,' so CAPEC-126 is the best approximation. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve a traditional network-level session token theft but rather a server-side shared-state race."}],"commit":"9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8","confidence":"medium","credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"David Cruciani"}],"cvssRationale":"AV:N: the chatbot is a network-accessible Flask endpoint. AC:H: exploitation requires concurrent or carefully timed requests from two different users to trigger the shared-session race, or a specific sequence of credential writes to the process environment. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate target is needed. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with chatbot access. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond their own request is required. VC:H: a user can read another user's sensitive data (private cases, investigations). VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact on separate components is demonstrated.","fixSummary":"The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user's identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure.","generatedAt":"2026-11-20T14:41:59.093131Z","generator":"patch2vuln.py","model":"qwen3.8:27b","modelComparison":{"potentialErrors":[],"rankings":[{"agreementScore":11,"assumptionCount":6,"confidence":"medium","model":"qwen3.8:27b","score":6}],"selectedModel":"qwen3.8:27b","selectionMethod":"deterministic-consensus-v1","selectionNotice":"The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."},"patchSha256":"b2eb7327abee28d605ef02f5af16f090ce7a643bd63bf2a5836e30539adfbb81","patchSummary":"Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user's API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.","patchTruncated":false,"patches":[{"commit":"9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8","date":"Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:37:34 +0100","patchSha256":"b2eb7327abee28d605ef02f5af16f090ce7a643bd63bf2a5836e30539adfbb81","retrievedAt":"2026-11-20T14:41:10.165065Z","source":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8","subject":"fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities"}],"source":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8","ssvc":{"options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"Supplier","timestamp":"2026-11-20T14:41:59Z","version":"2.0.3"},"subject":"fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities","weaknessRationale":[{"cweId":"CWE-290","rationale":"The shared MCP session and process-wide environment variable allowed one user's authenticated identity (API key) to be applied to another user's tool invocation. The per-request identity was not isolated, effectively allowing identity confusion or spoofing between concurrent sessions."},{"cweId":"CWE-200","rationale":"Because credentials were shared across requests and written to the process environment, a user could access data (e.g., private cases) belonging to another user whose key was cached in the shared session or ambient environment."}]}},"bcp-05-x-03":{"x_timeline":{"events":[{"description":"Corrective change authored (9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8): fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities","id":"evt-fix-developed-1","references":["https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8"],"timestamp":"2026-11-17T10:37:34Z","type":"fix-developed"},{"description":"Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.","id":"evt-fix-available-1","references":["https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8"],"timestamp":"2026-11-20T14:41:10.165065Z","type":"fix-available"}]}}},"recordType":"advisory","vulnId":"GCVE-1-2026-20421"}]},"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-11-20T16:21:43.134744Z","id":"CVE-2026-133853","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-11-20T16:33:24.293Z"}}]}}