{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2025-37894","assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"Linux","dateReserved":"2025-04-16T04:51:23.964Z","datePublished":"2025-05-20T15:21:31.283Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T11:58:09.042Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T11:58:09.042Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: use sock_gen_put() when sk_state is TCP_TIME_WAIT\n\nIt is possible for a pointer of type struct inet_timewait_sock to be\nreturned from the functions __inet_lookup_established() and\n__inet6_lookup_established(). This can cause a crash when the\nreturned pointer is of type struct inet_timewait_sock and\nsock_put() is called on it. The following is a crash call stack that\nshows sk->sk_wmem_alloc being accessed in sk_free() during the call to\nsock_put() on a struct inet_timewait_sock pointer. To avoid this issue,\nuse sock_gen_put() instead of sock_put() when sk->sk_state\nis TCP_TIME_WAIT.\n\nmrdump.ko        ipanic() + 120\nvmlinux          notifier_call_chain(nr_to_call=-1, nr_calls=0) + 132\nvmlinux          atomic_notifier_call_chain(val=0) + 56\nvmlinux          panic() + 344\nvmlinux          add_taint() + 164\nvmlinux          end_report() + 136\nvmlinux          kasan_report(size=0) + 236\nvmlinux          report_tag_fault() + 16\nvmlinux          do_tag_recovery() + 16\nvmlinux          __do_kernel_fault() + 88\nvmlinux          do_bad_area() + 28\nvmlinux          do_tag_check_fault() + 60\nvmlinux          do_mem_abort() + 80\nvmlinux          el1_abort() + 56\nvmlinux          el1h_64_sync_handler() + 124\nvmlinux        > 0xFFFFFFC080011294()\nvmlinux          __lse_atomic_fetch_add_release(v=0xF2FFFF82A896087C)\nvmlinux          __lse_atomic_fetch_sub_release(v=0xF2FFFF82A896087C)\nvmlinux          arch_atomic_fetch_sub_release(i=1, v=0xF2FFFF82A896087C)\n+ 8\nvmlinux          raw_atomic_fetch_sub_release(i=1, v=0xF2FFFF82A896087C)\n+ 8\nvmlinux          atomic_fetch_sub_release(i=1, v=0xF2FFFF82A896087C) + 8\nvmlinux          __refcount_sub_and_test(i=1, r=0xF2FFFF82A896087C,\noldp=0) + 8\nvmlinux          __refcount_dec_and_test(r=0xF2FFFF82A896087C, oldp=0) + 8\nvmlinux          refcount_dec_and_test(r=0xF2FFFF82A896087C) + 8\nvmlinux          sk_free(sk=0xF2FFFF82A8960700) + 28\nvmlinux          sock_put() + 48\nvmlinux          tcp6_check_fraglist_gro() + 236\nvmlinux          tcp6_gro_receive() + 624\nvmlinux          ipv6_gro_receive() + 912\nvmlinux          dev_gro_receive() + 1116\nvmlinux          napi_gro_receive() + 196\nccmni.ko         ccmni_rx_callback() + 208\nccmni.ko         ccmni_queue_recv_skb() + 388\nccci_dpmaif.ko   dpmaif_rxq_push_thread() + 1088\nvmlinux          kthread() + 268\nvmlinux          0xFFFFFFC08001F30C()"}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:N - The vulnerable code executes in the GRO packet-receive softirq path (`napi_gro_receive` → `ipv4/ipv6_gro_receive` → `tcp4/6_gro_receive` → `tcp4/6_check_fraglist_gro`), triggered purely by TCP segments arriving from the network. The reported real-world crash occurred on a modem/WAN interface receiving internet traffic.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race — it creates the TIME_WAIT sockets by opening and closing connections, deterministically tears them down on demand by sending an RST or out-of-window SYN for the same 4-tuple (`TCP_TW_RST`/`TCP_TW_SYN` → `inet_twsk_deschedule_put()`), and concurrently floods matching segments that drive the GRO lookup on other RX queues, so the final `sock_put()` reliably lands on a dying twsk. It can also groom the dedicated `tw_sock_TCP` slab to place a chosen victim object next to the out-of-bounds decrement.\nPR:N - No credentials or privileges of any kind are needed — GRO processing happens in softirq on raw received packets long before any socket-level authentication or delivery, and creating TIME_WAIT state only requires connecting to any reachable TCP port or emitting traffic through the box.\nUI:N - Exploitation is fully driven by attacker-transmitted packets; no local user action, mount, or file access is required.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds decrement, the potential indirect call, and the resulting corruption are all confined to the kernel's own memory and security authority, with no crossing into a hypervisor, IOMMU, or other security scope.\nC:H - The mistyped free reads far past the 264-byte timewait object — `sk_prot_creator` at +600 and `sk_destruct` at +736 — and the corrupted neighbouring `hlist_nulls` pointers turn subsequent ehash walks into reads of attacker-influenced addresses, giving a path to arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - `sk_free()` performs an atomic 32-bit read-modify-write 116 bytes out of bounds into an adjacent live `tcp_timewait_sock`, corrupting its hash-list pointers, which are later written through by `sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu()`; if the OOB word reads 1, `__sk_destruct()` additionally makes an indirect call through a function pointer sourced from out-of-bounds heap data, yielding a control-flow hijack primitive.\nA:H - The bug was reported as a confirmed kernel panic (KASAN/MTE tag-check fault in `sk_free()` → `panic()`), and a remote unauthenticated attacker can retrigger the out-of-bounds refcount decrement repeatedly, crashing the machine at will."}]}],"affected":[{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c","net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c"],"versions":[{"version":"c9d1d23e5239f41700be69133a5769ac5ebc88a8","lessThan":"c0dba059b118b5206e755042b15b49368a388898","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"c9d1d23e5239f41700be69133a5769ac5ebc88a8","lessThan":"786650e644c5b1c063921799ca203c0b8670d79a","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"c9d1d23e5239f41700be69133a5769ac5ebc88a8","lessThan":"f920436a44295ca791ebb6dae3f4190142eec703","status":"affected","versionType":"git"}]},{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c","net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c"],"versions":[{"version":"6.10","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","lessThan":"6.10","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.12.28","lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.14.6","lessThanOrEqual":"6.14.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.15","lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.28"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","versionEndExcluding":"6.14.6"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","versionEndExcluding":"6.15"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0dba059b118b5206e755042b15b49368a388898"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/786650e644c5b1c063921799ca203c0b8670d79a"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f920436a44295ca791ebb6dae3f4190142eec703"}],"title":"net: use sock_gen_put() when sk_state is TCP_TIME_WAIT","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}}}