{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2024-38306","assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"Linux","dateReserved":"2024-06-24T13:53:25.575Z","datePublished":"2024-06-25T14:22:36.903Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T11:32:32.056Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T11:32:32.056Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios\n\n[BUG]\nSince v6.8 there are rare kernel crashes reported by various people,\nthe common factor is bad page status error messages like this:\n\n  BUG: Bad page state in process kswapd0  pfn:d6e840\n  page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:000000007512f4f2 index:0x2796c2c7c\n  pfn:0xd6e840\n  aops:btree_aops ino:1\n  flags: 0x17ffffe0000008(uptodate|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fffff)\n  page_type: 0xffffffff()\n  raw: 0017ffffe0000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88826d0be4c0\n  raw: 00000002796c2c7c 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000\n  page dumped because: non-NULL mapping\n\n[CAUSE]\nCommit 09e6cef19c9f (\"btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to\nallocate-then-attach method\") changes the sequence when allocating a new\nextent buffer.\n\nPreviously we always called grab_extent_buffer() under\nmapping->i_private_lock, to ensure the safety on modification on\nfolio::private (which is a pointer to extent buffer for regular\nsectorsize).\n\nThis can lead to the following race:\n\nThread A is trying to allocate an extent buffer at bytenr X, with 4\n4K pages, meanwhile thread B is trying to release the page at X + 4K\n(the second page of the extent buffer at X).\n\n           Thread A                |                 Thread B\n-----------------------------------+-------------------------------------\n                                   | btree_release_folio()\n\t\t\t\t   | | This is for the page at X + 4K,\n\t\t\t\t   | | Not page X.\n\t\t\t\t   | |\nalloc_extent_buffer()              | |- release_extent_buffer()\n|- filemap_add_folio() for the     | |  |- atomic_dec_and_test(eb->refs)\n|  page at bytenr X (the first     | |  |\n|  page).                          | |  |\n|  Which returned -EEXIST.         | |  |\n|                                  | |  |\n|- filemap_lock_folio()            | |  |\n|  Returned the first page locked. | |  |\n|                                  | |  |\n|- grab_extent_buffer()            | |  |\n|  |- atomic_inc_not_zero()        | |  |\n|  |  Returned false               | |  |\n|  |- folio_detach_private()       | |  |- folio_detach_private() for X\n|     |- folio_test_private()      | |     |- folio_test_private()\n      |  Returned true             | |     |  Returned true\n      |- folio_put()               |       |- folio_put()\n\nNow there are two puts on the same folio at folio X, leading to refcount\nunderflow of the folio X, and eventually causing the BUG_ON() on the\npage->mapping.\n\nThe condition is not that easy to hit:\n\n- The release must be triggered for the middle page of an eb\n  If the release is on the same first page of an eb, page lock would kick\n  in and prevent the race.\n\n- folio_detach_private() has a very small race window\n  It's only between folio_test_private() and folio_clear_private().\n\nThat's exactly when mapping->i_private_lock is used to prevent such race,\nand commit 09e6cef19c9f (\"btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to\nallocate-then-attach method\") screwed that up.\n\nAt that time, I thought the page lock would kick in as\nfilemap_release_folio() also requires the page to be locked, but forgot\nthe filemap_release_folio() only locks one page, not all pages of an\nextent buffer.\n\n[FIX]\nMove all the code requiring i_private_lock into\nattach_eb_folio_to_filemap(), so that everything is done with proper\nlock protection.\n\nFurthermore to prevent future problems, add an extra\nlockdep_assert_locked() to ensure we're holding the proper lock.\n\nTo reproducer that is able to hit the race (takes a few minutes with\ninstrumented code inserting delays to alloc_extent_buffer()):\n\n  #!/bin/sh\n  drop_caches () {\n\t  while(true); do\n\t\t  echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches\n\t\t  echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory\n\t  done\n  }\n\n  run_tar () {\n\t  while(true); do\n\t\t  for x in `seq 1 80` ; do\n\t\t\t  tar cf /dev/zero /mnt > /dev/null &\n\t\t  done\n\t\t  wait\n\t  done\n  }\n\n  mkfs.btrfs -f -d single -m single\n---truncated---"}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - The vulnerable code is btrfs metadata page-cache management reached through ordinary filesystem syscalls (stat/readdir/read/open) on a locally mounted btrfs, plus locally-induced memory reclaim. No network protocol handler is involved.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race — concurrent metadata tree walks drive alloc_extent_buffer() while attacker-generated memory pressure drives btree_release_folio() — and can loop indefinitely; the race was hit repeatedly by ordinary users under normal load within days of v6.8.\nPR:L - Any unprivileged local user with read access to a mounted btrfs can reach alloc_extent_buffer() via btrfs_search_slot()/read_block_for_search(); no capability, mount privilege, or ioctl gate exists on the path.\nUI:N - No victim action is needed — btrfs is commonly the already-mounted root filesystem, and the attacker triggers both the allocation and the reclaim side entirely on their own.\nS:U - The refcount underflow and resulting page reuse are confined to the kernel's own memory-management authority; no VM, IOMMU, or hypervisor boundary is crossed.\nC:H - The folio refcount underflow frees a page that is still live in the btree page cache and still addressed via eb->addr, so the attacker can have that page reallocated to another subsystem and read its contents through btrfs metadata reads — an arbitrary kernel memory disclosure primitive.\nI:H - The same use-after-free page remains writable through btrfs metadata writeback after being handed to an unrelated allocation, giving a cross-object write primitive suitable for heap grooming and control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - The bug reliably produces \"BUG: Bad page state\" and kernel crashes in kswapd and other contexts, as reported by multiple users and syzbot."}]}],"affected":[{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["fs/btrfs/extent_io.c"],"versions":[{"version":"09e6cef19c9fc0e10547135476865b5272aa0406","lessThan":"952f048eb901881a7cc6f7c1368b53cd386ead7b","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"09e6cef19c9fc0e10547135476865b5272aa0406","lessThan":"f3a5367c679d31473d3fbb391675055b4792c309","status":"affected","versionType":"git"}]},{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["fs/btrfs/extent_io.c"],"versions":[{"version":"6.8","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","lessThan":"6.8","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.9.5","lessThanOrEqual":"6.9.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.10","lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.8","versionEndExcluding":"6.9.5"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.8","versionEndExcluding":"6.10"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952f048eb901881a7cc6f7c1368b53cd386ead7b"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3a5367c679d31473d3fbb391675055b4792c309"}],"title":"btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}},"adp":[{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","shortName":"CVE","dateUpdated":"2024-08-02T04:04:25.336Z"},"title":"CVE Program Container","references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952f048eb901881a7cc6f7c1368b53cd386ead7b","tags":["x_transferred"]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3a5367c679d31473d3fbb391675055b4792c309","tags":["x_transferred"]}]},{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"id":"CVE-2024-38306","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2024-09-10T17:08:21.055578Z"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2024-09-11T17:34:42.868Z"}}]}}