{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2023-53580","assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"Linux","dateReserved":"2025-10-04T15:14:15.926Z","datePublished":"2025-10-04T15:43:57.064Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T09:14:56.489Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T09:14:56.489Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: Gadget: core: Help prevent panic during UVC unconfigure\n\nAvichal Rakesh reported a kernel panic that occurred when the UVC\ngadget driver was removed from a gadget's configuration.  The panic\ninvolves a somewhat complicated interaction between the kernel driver\nand a userspace component (as described in the Link tag below), but\nthe analysis did make one thing clear: The Gadget core should\naccomodate gadget drivers calling usb_gadget_deactivate() as part of\ntheir unbind procedure.\n\nCurrently this doesn't work.  gadget_unbind_driver() calls\ndriver->unbind() while holding the udc->connect_lock mutex, and\nusb_gadget_deactivate() attempts to acquire that mutex, which will\nresult in a deadlock.\n\nThe simple fix is for gadget_unbind_driver() to release the mutex when\ninvoking the ->unbind() callback.  There is no particular reason for\nit to be holding the mutex at that time, and the mutex isn't held\nwhile the ->bind() callback is invoked.  So we'll drop the mutex\nbefore performing the unbind callback and reacquire it afterward.\n\nWe'll also add a couple of comments to usb_gadget_activate() and\nusb_gadget_deactivate().  Because they run in process context they\nmust not be called from a gadget driver's ->disconnect() callback,\nwhich (according to the kerneldoc for struct usb_gadget_driver in\ninclude/linux/usb/gadget.h) may run in interrupt context.  This may\nhelp prevent similar bugs from arising in the future."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - Both halves of the bug are reached through local interfaces — V4L2 file operations on the UVC gadget's `/dev/videoX` node and gadget (re)configuration via configfs/driver model — not through USB bus traffic from a host or over a network.\nAC:L - The attacker controls one side of the race entirely (when to open/subscribe/close the V4L2 handle) and gets an explicit signal plus a ~1.5 s window (device-removal uevent followed by `uvc_function_unbind()`'s 500 ms + 1000 ms timeouts), so the deadlock and subsequent use-after-free can be hit reliably and repeatedly.\nPR:L - An unprivileged local user with access to the UVC gadget video node (commonly group `video` on embedded, kiosk, and Android-derived devices) can hold the handle open and subscribed, which is all that is needed to turn gadget teardown into a deadlock and use-after-free; no root or capability is required on the attacking side.\nUI:N - Gadget unbind is driven by routine system events on affected devices (USB mode/role switches, cable-driven reconfiguration by system daemons, dwc3 DRD role change), not by a deliberate action of a separate victim user.\nS:U - The deadlock and the resulting use-after-free are confined to the kernel of the affected system; no VM, IOMMU, or other security-authority boundary is crossed.\nC:H - After the deadlock breaks, the release path operates on a destroyed workqueue and freed endpoint/request/descriptor objects; a local attacker who reclaims those allocations during the long, attacker-observable window obtains a kernel-memory read primitive.\nI:H - The same use-after-free — `cancel_work_sync()`/`queue_work()` on a freed `async_wq` and `usb_ep_dequeue()` on torn-down endpoints — dereferences attacker-groomable heap contents including function pointers, giving a write/control-flow-hijack primitive.\nA:H - The reported outcome is a kernel panic during UVC unconfigure, and the direct-call variant self-deadlocks on `udc->connect_lock` in uninterruptible state, permanently wedging the task and the entire USB gadget subsystem."}]}],"affected":[{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c"],"versions":[{"version":"d8195536ce2624e2947d9f56b1a61e7a27874bd3","lessThan":"bed19d95fcb9c98dfaa9585922b39a2dfba7898d","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"286d9975a838d0a54da049765fa1d1fb96b89682","lessThan":"8c1edc00db65f6d4408b3d1cd845e8da3b9e0ca4","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"286d9975a838d0a54da049765fa1d1fb96b89682","lessThan":"65dadb2beeb7360232b09ebc4585b54475dfee06","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"85102a45c7390caf124a3a5796574446f1e037b9","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"6.1.35","lessThan":"6.1.46","status":"affected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.3.9","lessThan":"6.4","status":"affected","versionType":"semver"}]},{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c"],"versions":[{"version":"6.4","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","lessThan":"6.4","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.1.46","lessThanOrEqual":"6.1.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.4.11","lessThanOrEqual":"6.4.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.5","lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.1.35","versionEndExcluding":"6.1.46"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.4","versionEndExcluding":"6.4.11"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.4","versionEndExcluding":"6.5"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.3.9"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bed19d95fcb9c98dfaa9585922b39a2dfba7898d"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c1edc00db65f6d4408b3d1cd845e8da3b9e0ca4"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65dadb2beeb7360232b09ebc4585b54475dfee06"}],"title":"USB: Gadget: core: Help prevent panic during UVC unconfigure","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}}}